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I. INTRODUCTION 
The State of Florida is a leader in many respects.  Florida is number 
one in beaches;
1
 number one in tropical hurricanes
2
 and lightning strikes;
3
 
and at or near the top per capita in mishandling abandoned, abused, and 
neglected children.
4
  Florida actually spends more money on the 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law School.  The author thanks 
research assistants Marisa Goldberg Wiggins, Joe H. Baldelomar, and Professor Michael Dale 
for their help in the preparation of this article. 
1. The Best Beach in America, Siesta Beach, DR. BEACH (2010), 
http://www.drbeach.org/top10beaches.htm. 
2. ERIC S. BLAKE ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE 
DEADLIEST, COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNITED STATES TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851 
TO 2004 (AND OTHER FREQUENTLY REQUESTED HURRICANE FACTS) 15–16 (2005), available at 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/NWS-TPC-4.pdf. 
3. Betsy Crisp, When Lightning Strikes, U. FLA. IFAS EXTENSION, 
http://pasco.ifas.ufl.edu/fcs/Lightning.shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
4. See Sofia Santana, Report:  Florida Child Death Rate High, SUN-
SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 2009, at B.8; see also J. KATE STOWELL, THE POLICY GRP. FOR FLA.’S 
FAMILIES & CHILDREN, THE STATE OF FLORIDA’S CHILD: A REPORT FOR THE FLORIDA 
CHILDREN AND YOUTH CABINET 5 (2009), available at http://childrensmovementflorida.org/
issues/children/the_state_of_floridas_child_report.pdf; Nat’l Kids Count, Kids Count Overall 
Rank, KIDS COUNT DATA CTR., http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/7288-kids-count-
overall-rank?loc=11&loct=2#detailed/2/11/false/36,868/any/14344 (last updated June 2013). 
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incarceration of children than on the education of children.
5
  With tens of 
thousands of children in the dependency system in Florida every year, the 
legal system and child protective services system are stressed.
6
  One glaring 
weakness in the Florida process is that each dependent child is not provided a 
lawyer for representation, except in exceptional circumstances.
7
  Although a 
minority of states fail to provide a dependent child his or her own lawyer, in 
Florida, it is actually much worse.
8
  Take the following example. 
Billy is a fourteen-year-old ninth grade high school student.  Along 
with his ten-year-old brother, Stevie, Billy lives with his mother, Julie, and 
his stepfather, Dave, who have been married for seven years.  Billy’s 
biological father abandoned Billy, his mother, and little brother many years 
ago.  Billy, his mother, and little brother have had a hard life.  Billy’s 
mother, Julie, did not graduate high school and has never held a steady job.  
Until she met and married Dave, Julie regularly relied on government 
benefits to help feed, house, and clothe herself and her children. 
When Julie married Dave, things changed.  Dave is a carpenter 
who—until the recent downturn in the housing market—had steady work, 
made enough money for the family to buy a small house, and provided for 
the children.  With the downturn in the housing market, Dave began losing 
work.  The family struggled to pay the bills despite Dave’s best efforts to 
find work.  The financial pressure finally got to Dave and he began drinking 
more heavily.  Julie took a job at a fast food restaurant to try to help out.  
This resulted in many nights of Dave coming home late, drunk, and picking 
arguments with Julie.  These arguments got progressively worse when Dave 
started physically hitting Julie.  When Billy tried to stop Dave from striking 
Julie, Dave hit Billy too. 
This kind of physical violence continued for several months until 
one day, the high school physical education teacher noticed the bruising and 
                                                 
5. Education vs Prison Costs, CNN MONEY, http://www.money.cnn.com/
infographic/economy/education-vs-prison-costs/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
6. See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
PROGRAM 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 5, 7 (2011), available at http://www.guardianadlitem.org/
documents/GALAnnualReport2011.pdf. 
7. See FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.217(a)–(b); In re Interest of D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 
83, 87 (Fla. 1980) (citing Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 705–06 (Fla. 1975)); Michael J. 
Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency and 
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida:  The Issue Updated, 35 NOVA L. REV. 
305, 327–28 (2011). 
8. See CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A 
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED & NEGLECTED CHILDREN 
16, 18–20, 45–46 (3d ed. 2012), available at www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/3rd_Ed_
Childs_Right_to_Counsel.pdf. 
2
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scarring on Billy’s face, which could not have been from football or 
wrestling practice.  The high school teacher called child protective services 
to report what he saw.  Child protective services, after investigating—and 
over the objection of Billy—removed both Billy and Stevie from the home 
where Julie and Dave lived, and placed both boys in foster care. 
In the time period before the dependency court hearing, Billy, who 
was at best confused by what was happening, was approached by child 
protective service caseworkers.  Billy was told—and received a business card 
stating—that the lawyers representing the child protective services 
government agency were part of the “‘Law Firm for Florida’s Children.’”9  
Further, Billy received a visit from a guardian ad litem who told Billy that 
the Guardian Ad Litem Program (“GAL Program”) would represent Billy’s 
legal interests.  Billy has consistently maintained that he wants to go back 
home to be with his brother, his mother, and Dave, despite what Dave did to 
him and his mother.  Billy believed in his heart that the family, with help, 
could be together again.  Billy relied on the representations made by the 
child protective services’ caseworker and the guardian ad litem that Billy’s 
wish to reunite his family would be represented in court by both.  Billy, 
therefore, had no idea that he might want to hire a lawyer, or that he might 
need to hire a lawyer, or that it might be in his best interest to hire a lawyer.  
Billy thought he was covered. 
 Such, of course, is not the case in Florida specifically, nor in other 
states.
10
  The state government agency involved in child protective services, 
the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) in Florida, is, in fact, the 
petitioner who brings a dependency petition on behalf of the state, and is not 
authorized to, and does not, act as the lawyer for an alleged dependent 
child.
11
  Further, in Florida, the guardian ad litem is a representative of the 
statewide GAL Program.
12
  The Florida GAL Program is a separate party to 
the dependency proceeding.
13
  Consequently, the GAL Program does not 
provide legal services or representation for an alleged dependent child.
14
  
Needless to say, Billy appeared in court without a lawyer and watched as 
both the DCF and the GAL Program advocated for Billy and Stevie to be 
permanently removed from their home with their mother and Dave.  No 
                                                 
9. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334. 
10. See, e.g., CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., supra note 8, at 41, 45, 52. 
11. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(21), .501(1) (2013); see also Dale & Reidenberg, 
supra note 7, at 327. 
12. FLA. STAT. § 39.820(1); Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 327, 331. 
13. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334. 
14. Id. at 327; see also Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office v. Office of State 
Att’y Twentieth Judicial Circuit, 55 So. 3d 747, 750 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
3
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lawyer advocated on behalf of Billy, and Billy was removed from his mother 
and stepfather’s home and separated from his younger brother Stevie. 
The purpose of this article is not to revisit the legal catastrophe that 
is Florida’s child protective services state agency and its GAL Program.15  It 
is clear that Florida’s DCF is systematically ineffective and the Florida GAL 
Program is legally impotent when it comes to providing legal representation 
for children in dependency proceedings.
16
  It has already been proven so!
17
  
Further, this article is not designed to call into question the unselfish 
commitment of so many volunteer guardian ad litems and others who act 
with good intentions to protect abandoned, abused, and neglected children in 
Florida.
18
  Rather, the purpose of this article is very different. 
The design of this article is to suggest that perhaps—using Florida as 
an example—one unexplored avenue to clean up and boost the effectiveness 
of the government agencies involved in the dependency process is to first 
require that these agencies not unfairly or deceptively lure unsuspecting 
children into believing that their legal rights are in any way protected in a 
dependency proceeding by these government agencies.
19
 
Therefore, this article begins with examining whether or not state 
agencies—in particular the child protective services state agencies—can be 
subject to prosecution under state unfair and deceptive trade practice 
statutes.
20
  The first part of this article will outline the fundamental concepts 
that define a cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade practice.
21
  Next, 
this article will examine whether such state consumer protection laws have 
ever been applied to government entities and activities.
22
  Then, this article 
will analyze if an alleged dependent child could successfully maintain a 
cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade practice against these child 
protective services government agencies when the state agencies 
                                                 
15. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334–35. 
16. Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in Dependency 
Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769, 773 (2001); Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, 
at 334; see also Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office, 55 So. 3d at 750. 
17. See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 5. 
18. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 327–28.  There are roughly 9600 
volunteer guardian ad litems in Florida who must be applauded for their service.  Volunteer, 
Frequently Asked Questions, FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, http://
www.guardianadlitem.org/vol_faq.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. Id. 
22. See infra Part III. 
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misrepresent their role in the dependency process.
23
  Finally, this article will 
conclude by outlining how the seemingly inapplicable state unfair and 
deceptive trade practice statutes may be used to protect dependent children.
24
 
II. STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE STATUTES 
“All fifty states . . . have enacted at least one statute” designed to 
protect consumers from deceptive or unfair trade practices.
25
  In most states, 
the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (“UDAP”) statutes 
unambiguously provide for a private right of action against a person or entity 
that commits unfair or deceptive trade practices.
26
  These UDAP statutes 
routinely advise that great weight and due deference be given to the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the federal courts’ interpretation of the FTC 
Act as to what comprises an unfair or deceptive practice.
27
  This deference to 
the FTC and the federal courts is designed to aid state courts in establishing 
their own judicial determination of what kind of conduct amounts to an 
unfair or deceptive trade practice.
28
 
The FTC Act, the FTC guidelines and policy statements, and the 
federal courts broadly define and construe what is an unfair or deceptive 
trade practice.
29
  For example, there is federal court precedent backed by 
FTC policy statements that defines a deceptive trade practice as any act or 
practice that has the tendency or capacity to deceive.
30
  The most recent FTC 
policy statement on deceptive trade practices—which has been adopted by 
some federal and state courts—defines a deceptive trade practice as any act 
or “practice that . . . is likely to [deceive] consumers acting reasonably under 
                                                 
23. See infra Part IV. 
24. See infra Part V. 
25. CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE 
ACTS AND PRACTICES 1 (8th ed. 2012). 
26. Id. at 722. 
27. Id. at 197; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012) (containing a broad and 
general definition). 
28. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 197–98.  Because the FTC Act 
does not provide for a private right of action, it can only be interpreted to evidence “what 
conduct is prohibited by [the] state UDAP statute[s].”  Id. at 197. 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 
676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944); In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164–65 (1984); Letter from 
James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, United States House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm. 
30. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp., 143 F.2d at 680. 
5
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the circumstances.”31  Regardless of which standard a federal or state court 
chooses to adopt, neither standard requires proof of intent, negligence, fraud, 
or even actual deception to make out a prima facie case.
32
  In sum, proof of a 
deceptive trade practice focuses on the act or practice, and whether such act 
or practice might mislead or deceive a person.
33
  This is similar to the 
definition and interpretation of what constitutes an unfair trade practice.
34
 
The federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United 
States, have defined and construed an unfair trade practice to include an act 
or practice that “offends established public policy and . . . is immoral, 
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or . . . injurious to consumers.”35  In 
particular, the Court endorsed such a broad and sweeping definition of an 
unfair trade practice because it noted that “‘[t]here is no [end] to human 
inventiveness’” for those who choose to treat people unfairly.36  Further, just 
like with deceptive trade practices, the federal courts and the FTC do not 
require proof of intent, negligence, fraud, or actual deception for an act or 
practice to be considered unfair.
37
 
The most recent version of the FTC Act and the FTC policy 
statements—adopted in some federal and state courts—revised the definition 
of an unfair trade practice.
38
  In particular, the revised definition of an unfair 
                                                 
31. In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 164–65; see also FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1965) (holding that “misrepresentation of any fact 
which would constitute a material factor in a purchaser’s decision whether to buy” will be 
deemed a deceptive trade practice); Letter from James C. Miller III, supra note 29. 
32. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(concluding that proof of deceptive intent is unnecessary); Grove v. Huffman, 634 N.E.2d 
1184, 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (quoting Connor v. Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc., 581 N.E.2d 
196, 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)) (holding that a plaintiff is not required to prove actual 
deception, reliance, or fraud); Brandon v. Winnett, No. 01A01-9411-CH00529, 1995 WL 
444385, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1995) (finding a negligent misrepresentation sufficient 
to render the trade practice deceptive).  But see CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW 
CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE 
ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 16–17 (2009), available at www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf. 
33. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1368; Brandon, 1995 WL 
444385, at *5; CARTER, supra note 32, at 16–17. 
34. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing FTC v. 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45 n.5 (1972)). 
35. Id. (citing Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 244–45 n.5 (1972)). 
36. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 240 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 63-
1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.)). 
37. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1368; Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 
405 U.S. at 244–45 n.5; FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1965); 
Spiegel, 540 F.2d at 293 (citing Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 244–45 n.5). 
38. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
6
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trade practice requires that the act or practice “‘causes or is likely to cause 
substantial [consumer injury that cannot be] reasonably avoid[ed] by [the] 
consumer[] . . . and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to [the] 
consumer[].’”39 
Most states adhere to one or both of these FTC and federal court-
generated definitions of what constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice.
40
  In addition, most states require that such unfair or deceptive trade 
practices arise in trade or commerce.
41
  Trade or commerce is consistently 
defined by UDAP statutes as any profit or non-profit oriented transaction.
42
  
In essence, so long as the act or practice in question can be linked in some 
way to trade or commerce, the act or practice will be covered by a state 
UDAP statute.
43
 
III. APPLICATION OF STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE 
STATUTES TO GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES 
Countering this seemingly uninhibited coverage of UDAP statutes, 
most states exempt some acts or practices and some persons from the reach 
of UDAP statutes.
44
  Common UDAP statutory exemptions include banks, 
savings and loan companies, insurance providers, and utility companies.
45
  
Prohibiting recovery against a state or other government agency is an 
uncommon exemption under UDAP statutes.
46
  However, some states have 
addressed the issue via case law.
47
  For example, in Du Page Aviation Corp. 
                                                 
39. Neovi, 604 F.3d at 1155 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)). 
40. See Camacho v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 488, 494 & n.12 
(Ct. App.), reh’g granted and depublished by B180134, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 919 (Ct. App. 
June 1, 2006); State ex rel. Miller v. Cutty’s Des Moines Camping Club, Inc., 694 N.W.2d 
518, 525 (Iowa 2005); State v. Weinschenk, 868 A.2d 200, 206 (Me. 2005); Tucker v. Sierra 
Builders, 180 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
41. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 11, 197. 
42. See id., at 11–12.  Moreover, some states include non-profit or not-for-
profit activities within the definition of trade and commerce.  E.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8) 
(2013). 
43. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 11. 
44. See id. at 118–20. 
45. CARTER, supra note 32, at 14–15. 
46. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 118; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.212; 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2013); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-104 (2013). 
47. Hawaii, Massachusetts, and California have permitted suits against the 
government.  See Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 111 (Ct. App. 1999); 
Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1123–25 (D. Haw. 2002); Pierce v. Dew, 626 F. Supp. 
386, 388 (D. Mass. 1986).  Illinois, Montana, Texas, Washington, Connecticut, and North 
Carolina have excluded government entities from liability under each state’s respective UDAP 
statute.  See City of Danbury v. Dana Inv. Corp., 730 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Conn. 1999) 
7
Flynn: Trick or Treat: The Application of the State UDAP Statutes to Gov
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
108 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
v. Du Page Airport Authority,
48
 the Illinois court considered the applicability 
of its UDAP statute to municipal corporations, and found that such 
corporations could not be sued under that statute.
49
  The court reasoned that 
municipal corporations do not fall under the definition of person as required 
by the UDAP statute.
50
  Since the statute specifically mentioned both 
domestic and foreign corporations as possible defendants, the court 
concluded that the failure of the statute to specifically mention municipal 
corporations indicated that the legislature intended to exempt municipal 
corporations from an unfair or deceptive trade practice lawsuit.
51
 
Similarly, in Montana Vending, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
Montana,
52
 the Montana court found that the state’s UDAP statute could not 
be enforced against a government defendant, since the plain meaning of 
person could not be construed to include a government entity.
53
  The court 
went on to note that the government entity in the case––a school district––
was not engaged in a business activity at the time and therefore, could not be 
sued under the state’s UDAP statute.54  This analysis suggests that had the 
school district or other government agency been engaged in trade or 
commerce—as defined by the Montana UDAP statute and the Montana 
courts—a UDAP cause of action would be cognizable.55 
Texas also exempts the government agencies from liability under the 
state’s UDAP statute.56  According to Texas law, “[g]overnmental immunity 
                                                                                                                   
(concluding that municipalities fall under the exemption for “actions . . . permitted under law 
as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the 
state”); Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Auth., 594 N.E.2d 1334, 1341 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1992); Montana Vending, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Mont., 78 P.3d 499, 505–06 
(Mont. 2003); State v. Furio, 148 S.E.2d 275, 277 (N.C. 1966); Rea Constr. Co. v. City of 
Charlotte, 465 S.E.2d 342, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Sperry Corp. v. Patterson, 325 
S.E.2d 642, 644 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)) (finding that neither a state, city, town, nor agency of 
the state may be sued under North Carolina’s UDAP statute); Jefferson Cnty. v. Bernard, 148 
S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App. 2004); Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of 
Snohomish Cnty., 459 P.2d 633, 636 (Wash. 1969) (finding that the legislature’s failure to 
include municipal corporations under the section listing entities subject to the statute renders 
municipalities exempt from suit). 
48. 594 N.E.2d 1334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
49. Id. at 1341. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. 78 P.3d 499 (Mont. 2003). 
53. Id. at 505–06. 
54. Id. 
55. See id. 
56. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West 2013); Jefferson Cnty. v. 
Bernard, 148 S.W.3d 698, 700 (Tex. App. 2004). 
8
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protects governmental units of the [s]tate from” UDAP lawsuits.57  
Therefore, UDAP claims against the government or its agencies will be 
permitted only if there is a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity.
58
  In 
Jefferson County v. Bernard,
59
 the Texas court was faced with determining 
whether the inclusion of the term governmental entities in the UDAP 
statute’s definition of persons covered in the statute constituted a waiver of 
sovereign immunity.
60
  The court reasoned that the waiver of sovereign 
immunity must be clear and “[a]ny ambiguities in a statute are to be resolved 
in favor of retaining immunity.”61  Therefore, the court held that the 
inclusion of the phrase governmental entities was insufficient to indicate a 
waiver of governmental immunity.
62
  However, it is important to note that 
the Texas UDAP statute is one of the weakest in the country,
63
 and unlike the 
majority of states, Texas chooses to interpret its UDAP statute narrowly.
64
  
Consequently, it is unlikely that other states faced with this issue would 
come to the same conclusion.
65
 
The purpose of UDAP statutes is to provide extensive protection 
from the broadest range of unfair and deceptive practices.
66
  The holding, set 
forth in the Texas case, seems to contradict this purpose by exempting 
governmental entities from the scope of the statutes.
67
  By narrowly 
interpreting terms such as person or governmental entities, these states are 
allowing injured consumers to go without a remedy.
68
  In order to advance 
the true purpose of UDAP statutes, courts should interpret each aspect of the 
statute as liberally as possible in order to ensure coverage to the most 
consumers.
69
  Despite the results in Texas and other states, some other states 
                                                 
57. Bernard, 148 S.W.3d at 700. 
58. Id. 
59. 148 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). 
60. Id. at 701. 
61. Id. (citing Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 
2003)). 
62. Id. 
63. See CARTER, supra note 32, at 11. 
64. See id. 
65. Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 109 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996) (distinguishing the narrow Texas UDAP statute from the broad UDAP statute of 
Florida). 
66. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 (1972). 
67. See Bernard, 148 S.W.3d at 702. 
68. See id. at 701–02. 
69. See Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 239–40. 
9
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have reached the opposite result and permit consumers to bring UDAP 
claims against governmental entities.
70
 
UDAP statutes have been applied against government agencies in a 
few states.
71
  However, the majority of states have not yet had occasion to 
decide this issue.72  Unless there is a specific statutory exemption regarding 
lawsuits against the government, there appears to be no absolute obstacle in 
applying UDAP statutes to government agencies engaging in deceptive 
practices.
73 
Further, if the government engages in an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice in which consumers suffer a loss, such consumers should have a 
method of recovery under the UDAP statutes.
74
  Permitting such lawsuits 
would advance the exact purpose of UDAP statutes; namely, to protect the 
public from unfair and deceptive practices.
75
 
Both Hawaii and Massachusetts permit state agencies to be sued 
under their respective UDAP statues.
76
  Several entities are exempt under the 
Hawaii UDAP statute; however, the statute is silent as to municipalities.
77
  In 
Daly v. Harris,
78
 the Hawaii court concluded that this silence indicated that 
                                                 
70. Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1122–23 (D. Haw. 2002); Pierce v. 
Dew, 626 F. Supp. 386, 387–88 (D. Mass. 1986). 
71. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23; Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88. 
72. See Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387. 
73. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 118.  Other articles have 
addressed how statutes have been extended to cover other entities not explicitly noted in the 
statutory provisions.  See also Michael Flynn, Physician Business (Mal)practice, 20 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 333, 345–46 (1996) (finding that the “scarcity of . . . statutory provisions and case 
law”—regarding UDAP statutes’ application to learned professionals—support the notion that 
the statutes could extend to learned professionals); Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are 
Saying is Give Business a Chance:  The Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business-to-
Business Transactions, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 81, 87–89 (2003) (discussing which states 
permit a business to sue another business). 
74. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 10–11. 
75. Id. 
76. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; see also Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88.  
California has also permitted suits against state agencies in violation of the state UDAP 
statute, though inconsistently.  Compare Trinkle v. Cal. State Lottery, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496, 
499–500 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that “[o]nly through an unreasonable, strained 
construction” can the government entity fall under the term person; thus, the cause of action 
failed), and Janis v. Cal. State Lottery Comm’n, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 553 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(finding a government entity is not a person subject to suit; thus, the cause of action failed as a 
matter of law), with Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 94 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(permitting suit against a government entity, but relying on specific language that authorized 
the fund in question). 
77. See Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23. 
78. 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Haw. 2002). 
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the statute did indeed permit UDAP lawsuits against the government.
79
  
According to Hawaiian “legislative history and judicial interpretation,” a 
strong movement in the direction of increased consumer protection has 
developed.
80
  The court noted that the legislature consequently utilized 
“‘broad’ and ‘sweeping terms’” in the UDAP statute to provide protection to 
as many consumers as possible.
81
  Therefore, when in doubt, the language of 
the statute should be interpreted liberally.
82
  The court further determined 
that the sole limitation set forth in the UDAP statute is the requirement that 
“acts or practices be done ‘in the conduct of any trade or commerce.’”83  
Taking into account such considerations, the court held that so long as the 
government agency in question is engaged in trade or commerce, such 
agency may be sued under Hawaii’s UDAP statute.84 
In making this ruling, the Hawaii court looked to the Massachusetts 
courts, which were also faced with the same issue.
85
  In Pierce v. Dew,
86
 the 
Massachusetts court had to determine whether a governmental entity may be 
held liable under the state UDAP statute.
87
  The Massachusetts UDAP statute 
allows for suits against “‘natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, 
incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entity.’”88  
As similarly mentioned by the Daly court above, the Massachusetts UDAP 
statute is intended to be a “‘statute of broad impact.’”89  Therefore, when in 
doubt, it is in the court’s best interest to interpret the UDAP statute in the 
most liberal manner.
90
  Consequently, since there was no legislative evidence 
that indicated otherwise, the court found the phrase “‘any other legal entity’” 
to include governmental agencies.
91
 
                                                 
79. Id. at 1123–25. 
80. Id. at 1122. 
81. Id. (quoting Han v. Yang, 931 P.2d 604, 619 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997)). 
82. Id. at 1124 (quoting Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 905 P.2d 29, 43 
(Haw. 1995)). 
83. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (quoting Cieri, 905 P.2d at 37). 
84. Id. at 1122–23 (quoting United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee, 
521 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Mass. 1988)). 
85. Id. at 1123 (citing Cieri, 905 P.2d at 37–38). 
86. 626 F. Supp. 386 (D. Mass. 1986). 
87. Id. at 387. 
88. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 1(a) (2013)). 
89. Id. at 388 (quoting Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 772 
(Mass. 1975)); see also Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (citing Han v. Yang, 931 P.2d 604, 619 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1997)). 
90. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (quoting Cieri, 905 P.2d at 43). 
91. Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88 (citing Keane, Inc. v. Boston Water & 
Sewer Comm’n, No. 50133 (Suffolk Superior Court, Dec. 16, 1981)). 
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In United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee,
92
 the 
Massachusetts court further developed its stance regarding whether a 
governmental entity may be a proper defendant in a UDAP lawsuit.
93
  The 
court recognized that the legislature had maintained its silence on this issue; 
thus, the court found it necessary to focus its analysis on whether the 
potential government defendant engaged in trade or commerce.
94
  Though 
the defendant in the case had not been participating in any business-like 
endeavors, the analysis set forth by the court suggests that had the defendant 
engaged in such activities, the UDAP statute would have applied and been 
violated.
95
 
Both the Hawaii and Massachusetts courts promote a broad 
interpretation of each state’s UDAP statute’s text.96  Though most courts 
have yet to face the issue of whether a government entity may be a proper 
defendant under state UDAP statutes,
97
 Hawaii and Massachusetts indicate 
that such lawsuits may well fit within the reach of UDAP statues.
98
  Since the 
majority of state UDAP statutes are both expansive in scope and contain 
broad prohibitions against unfair and deceptive acts, state courts should be 
able to permit lawsuits against the government and its entities when such 
parties are engaging in unfair and deceptive acts or practices.
99
 
IV. APPLICATION OF STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE 
STATUTES BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF A DEPENDENT CHILD 
There has yet to be a case in this country in which a dependent child 
has maintained a cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade practice 
against a state agency, when such agency misrepresented to the child its role 
in a dependency proceeding.
100
  Yet, UDAP statutes seem to be broad 
                                                 
92. 521 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1988). 
93. Id. at 744. 
94. Id.; Genesco Entm’t, Inc. v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 750–51 (S.D.N.Y 
1984) (finding courts must focus on whether the practice in question arose out of trade or 
commerce). 
95. United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee, 521 N.E.2d 741, 744 
(Mass. 1988); see also Bedrosian, L.L.C. v. Costanza, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 459, 459–60 (Super. 
Ct. 1999) (concluding that municipality may be subject to suit so long as the municipality 
engaged in trade or commerce). 
96. Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1122 (D. Haw. 2002) (quoting Han 
v. Yang, 931 P.2d 604, 619 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997)); Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 388 (quoting 
Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 772 (Mass. 1975)). 
97. See, e.g., Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88. 
98. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88. 
99. See CARTER, supra note 32, app. at 24–29. 
100. See id. 
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enough to enable a dependent child to initiate such a claim when the state 
agency deceives or treats a dependent child unfairly.
101
  The key to such a 
claim is to examine the nature of the dependent child’s claim and determine 
if such a claim fits within the UDAP statute prohibitions.
102
 
Florida provides an example of how the courts could permit a UDAP 
claim against government agencies on behalf of dependent children.
103
  The 
Florida UDAP statute, which is typical of most state UDAP statutes, 
prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce.”104  Florida specifically requires that the provisions of the statute 
be construed liberally in order to promote the policies set forth in the statute, 
which includes protecting the consuming public.
105
  Therefore, the Florida 
UDAP statute is a broadly written statute.
106
 
In order to determine whether a cause of action could indeed be 
brought against a state agency for misrepresenting its role in a dependency 
proceeding, the facts set forth in the opening anecdote involving Billy’s 
dependency proceeding will be analyzed.  First, the Florida UDAP statute 
defines a consumer as “an individual; child, by and through [the child’s] 
parent or legal guardian; business; firm; . . . corporation; any commercial 
entity, however denominated; or any other group or combination.”107  Billy is 
a child and, therefore, fits within the definition of a consumer.
108
 
Next, the Florida UDAP statute requires that unfair or deceptive 
practices arise in trade or commerce.
109
  The phrase trade or commerce is 
                                                 
101. See id. at 24–29. 
102. See FLA. STAT. §§ 501.203(7), .204 (2013); CARTER, supra note 32, app. 
at 7–10. 
103. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204. 
104. Id. § 501.204(1). 
105. Id. § 501.202. 
106. Hanson Hams, Inc. v. HBH Franchise Co., No. 03-61198-CIV, 2003 WL 
22768687, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2003) (citing Day v. Le-Jo Enters., Inc., 521 So. 2d 175, 
178 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)) (finding courts have regarded the Florida UDAP statute as 
extremely broad); see also, e.g., Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
107. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(7).  At least thirty-four states would grant a private 
right of action to a person or a consumer like Billy.  See id.; see also ALA. CODE §§ 8-19-3(2), 
(5), -10(a) (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1402(1), (8), :1409(A) (2013); MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 75-24-3(a), -15(1) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1(I), :10(I) (2013); 73 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-2(2), -9.2(a) (West 2013). 
108. See FLA. STAT. § 501.203(7) and see supra hypothetical Part I. 
109. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1).  Many states require that the unfair or deceptive 
trade practice arise from trade or commerce.  ALA. CODE § 8-19-5; ALASKA STAT. § 
45.50.471(a) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b(a) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 480-2(a) (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-601 (2013); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
13
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defined as “the advertising, soliciting, providing, offering, or distributing, 
whether by sale, rental, or otherwise, of any good or service, . . . whether 
tangible or intangible, . . . wherever situated.”110  This is an expansive 
definition of trade or commerce and seems to cover more than what would 
conventionally be considered business activities.
111
  The actions of both the 
child protective services caseworkers and the GAL representatives fit this 
definition.
112
  By providing Billy with a business card, the child protective 
services caseworker engaged in a form of advertisement.
113
  The business 
card is tangible evidence of trade or commerce.
114
  Further, the 
representation that the child protective services government agency is the 
law firm for Florida’s children is tangible evidence that a service is being 
offered to Billy.
115
  In addition, the GAL Program representative declared to 
Billy that the GAL Program represented him in the dependency 
proceeding.
116
  This kind of statement also fits within the definition of trade 
or commerce because the GAL Program is providing legal services.
117
 
The Florida UDAP statute requires that “due consideration and great 
weight shall be given to the interpretations of the [FTC] and the federal 
courts.”118  Therefore, the FTC and the federal court definitions of unfair and 
deceptive trade practices apply to the Florida Statutes.
119
  Under FTC and 
federal court precedent, an act or practice is a deceptive trade practice if the 
act or practice is likely to, or “has the tendency [or] capacity to . . . deceive” 
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.
120
  Further, proof of 
                                                                                                                   
505/2 (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.170(1) (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
51:1405(A); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(a) (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.903(1) 
(2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (2013); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 59-1602 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-3 
(2013); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 2013); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-3; 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-2 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
47-18-104(a) (2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (West 2013); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 13-5-2.5(1) (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(a) (2013); W. VA. CODE 
§ 46A-6-104 (2013). 
110. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8). 
111. Id. 
112. See id. and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
113. See Florida Bar v. Matus, 528 So. 2d 895, 895 (Fla. 1988) and see 
hypothetical supra Part I. 
114. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8); Matus, 528 So. 2d at 895. 
115. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
116. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
117. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8). 
118. Id. § 501.204(2). 
119. See id. 
120. In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 153 (1984) (citing Chrysler Corp. 
v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
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intent, negligence, fraud, or actual deception is not required to establish such 
a prohibited practice.
121
  The FTC and federal court definitions are intended 
to be flexible and do not require a specific rule to be violated in order for 
deception to be found.
122
  The FTC has determined that oral 
misrepresentations and failures to disclose material facts both violate the 
FTC Act.
123
  Therefore, any oral misrepresentation or failure by a party to 
disclose a material fact will be deemed sufficiently deceptive under the 
Florida UDAP statute.
124
  Further, federal courts have held that if a practice 
“offends established public policy, . . . is immoral, unethical, oppressive, 
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers,” such practice is 
unfair.
125
  Again, proof of intent, negligence, fraud, or actual deception is not 
required for an act to be deemed unfair.
126
 
Viewed from the perspective of Billy, he reasonably believed that 
both the state child protective services caseworker and the GAL Program 
were his legal representatives and would advocate on his behalf.
127
  When the 
child protective services caseworker handed Billy a business card stating that 
his agency was the law firm for Florida children, a reasonably prudent 
person—even if not a child like Billy—would have every reason to believe 
that the caseworker would indeed be his legal representative in court.
128
  The 
caseworker failed to mention that he is in fact the petitioner who brings the 
dependency petition on behalf of the state.
129
  By failing to properly disclose 
the child protective services worker’s true role in the dependency 
proceeding, the caseworker failed to disclose material facts that may have 
impacted Billy’s decision to even think about obtaining his own lawyer.130  
                                                 
121. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir. 1988); 
Grove v. Huffman, 634 N.E.2d 1184, 1187–88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Brandon v. Winnett, No. 
01A01-9411-CH00529, 1995 WL 444385, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1995). 
122. Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam) (citing Rollins, Inc. v. Heller, 454 So. 2d 580, 584 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 1984)). 
123. In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532, 1556 (1975). 
124. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(2) (2013). 
125. Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing FTC v. 
Sperry & Hutchinson, Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972)). 
126. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1368. 
127. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
128. See id.; see also Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Father & Son Moving & 
Storage, Inc., 643 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 
561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (stating that “an advertisement is considered deceptive if 
it has the capacity to convey misleading impressions to consumers”). 
129. FLA. STAT. § 39.501(1) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
130. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1); In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532, 
1556 (1975) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
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The caseworker misled Billy, who acted reasonably under the 
circumstances.
131
  Such deceptive actions by the caseworker are prohibited 
under the Florida UDAP statute.
132
 
Further, when the GAL Program representative visited Billy, the 
representative explained that the GAL Program served as Billy’s 
representative in court and would advocate on his behalf.
133
  Billy 
consistently maintained that he wanted to return to his home and be with his 
mother, brother, and stepfather.
134
  Instead, the GAL Program advocated for 
Billy’s separation from his mother, brother, and stepfather, and 
recommended Billy’s removal from his home during the actual 
proceeding.
135
  Again, a reasonably prudent person in Billy’s position would 
have had every reason to believe that the GAL Program would advocate for 
what Billy wanted.
136
  By relying on the oral misrepresentations made by the 
GAL Program representative, Billy acted reasonably when he did not hire a 
lawyer.
137
  Such deceptive actions by the GAL Program are prohibited under 
the Florida UDAP statute.
138
 
Moreover, both the caseworker and the GAL Program representative 
engaged in unfair practices by misrepresenting their respective roles to 
Billy.
139
  Billy is a child faced with a very difficult and emotionally 
demanding situation—Billy is at least scared, worried, confused, and 
vulnerable.
140
  Both the caseworker and the GAL Program representative 
have an ethical, if not moral, responsibility to properly advise Billy, and the 
failure to do so breaches their duties as public officials to carry out the 
legislative policy to protect dependent children.
141
  Instead, both parties 
treated Billy unfairly by denying him legal representation when Billy 
                                                 
131. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
132. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
133. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. See Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Father & Son Moving & Storage, Inc., 643 
So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 
(D.C. Cir. 1977)) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
137. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
138. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2013). 
139. See id. 
140. See hypothetical supra Part I. 
141. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing FTC v. 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45 n.5 (1972)) (reasoning that under the Florida 
UDAP statute, immoral acts are unfair practices); Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 
So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam) (quoting Spiegel, Inc., 540 F.2d at 
293). 
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reasonably believed he was covered.
142
  Billy had no way to know that he 
could even ask for a lawyer, much less that he needed a lawyer, and that the 
GAL Program was prohibited from acting as his lawyer in the dependency 
proceeding; the GAL Program’s actions would fit as an unfair trade practice 
under the Florida UDAP statute.
143
 
Next, Billy must contend with the exemptions section of the Florida 
UDAP statute.
144
  The Florida UDAP statute does not specifically mention 
that the government or government agencies are exempt from lawsuits 
claiming deceptive or unfair trade practices.
145
  However, no Florida court 
has determined if this absence from the exemptions section of the UDAP 
statute permits unfair and deceptive trade practice claims against a 
government agency, like the child protective services state agency or the 
GAL Program.
146
  Yet, the Florida courts have determined this same issue 
with reference to professionals.
147
  In Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Associates, 
P.A.,
148
 a Florida district court was asked to determine whether an attorney 
may be sued under Florida’s UDAP statute.149  Like government agencies, 
neither attorneys specifically, nor learned professionals in general, are 
mentioned under the exemptions section of the statute.
150
  The court reasoned 
that the legislature’s unambiguous failure to mention attorneys in the statute 
exemptions indicates that attorneys are not exempt from a UDAP claim.
151
  
The court noted that neither a Florida District Court of Appeal nor the 
Supreme Court of Florida has decided otherwise.
152
  Therefore, since the 
legislature similarly made no mention of government agencies under the 
exemptions section of the statute, such agencies are not exempted from 
suit.
153
  Therefore, Billy’s claim against both the child protective services 
government agency and the GAL Program is not exempt from enforcement 
under the Florida UDAP statute.
154
 
                                                 
142. FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(20) and see hypothetical supra Part I. 
143. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1); Urling, 468 So. 2d at 453 (quoting Spiegel, 
Inc., 540 F.2d at 293 (noting that if an act results in a substantial injury, such act is unfair)); 
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334. 
144. FLA. STAT. § 501.212. 
145. See id. 
146. Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Assocs., P.A., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1371 
(S.D. Fla. 2010); see also FLA. STAT. § 501.212. 
147. Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. 
148. 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
149. Id. at 1371. 
150. FLA. STAT. § 501.212. 
151. Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. 
152. Id. 
153. See FLA. STAT. § 501.212; Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. 
154. FLA. STAT. § 501.212; Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. 
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In sum, there appears to be no impediment to Billy—as a dependent 
child—bringing a lawsuit against the child protective services government 
agency or the GAL Program for unfair and deceptive trade practices. 
V. EFFECT OF APPLYING STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE 
PRACTICE STATUTES TO ENSURE PROTECTION OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN 
Perhaps the use of a UDAP statute as a remedy for a dependent 
child’s denial of legal representation seems a bit strange and stretched.  
However, such use of a UDAP statute seems no more strange or stretched 
than the failure to provide dependent children with a lawyer in a dependency 
proceeding.  After all, the purpose of the dependency proceeding is to 
provide government protection to children who have been abused, neglected, 
or abandoned.
155
  Denying such dependent children their own legal 
representation subjects these children to abuse, neglect, and abandonment 
within the dependency process.
156
  The lack of legal representation for 
dependent children—when cloaked with deception and unfairness—cries out 
for a legal remedy.
157
  State UDAP statutes provide just such a remedy.
158
  
Most state UDAP statutes—just like Florida’s—provide as remedies for an 
unfair or deceptive trade practice injunctive relief, economic damages, and 
the prospect of prevailing party attorney’s fees and costs.159  In Billy’s case, 
an injunction mandating that the child protective services state agency and 
the GAL Program refrain from misrepresenting their function and not 
advising Billy that he needs to at least consider, if not obtain, his own lawyer 
to represent him in a dependency proceeding, would ensure that these 
government agencies refrain from deceptive and unfair acts or practices.
160
  
Although economic damages might be difficult to prove, the prospect of 
recovering attorney’s fees and costs would encourage lawyers to take on the 
representation of Billy in a state UDAP claim.
161
 
                                                 
155. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(a). 
156. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Developmental Issues for Young Children in 
Foster Care, 106 PEDIATRICS 1145, 1148 (2000); CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., supra 
note 8 at 15–17; Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 352; Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
By allowing state UDAP claims against government entities, courts 
would accomplish two goals.  First, such a determination would place the 
government on the same legal footing as any other illegitimate business that 
uses unfair or deceptive trade practices to gain an advantage.
162
  Second, in 
the context of dependent children, such a determination would prevent the 
government from further abusing abused, neglected, and abandoned 
children.
163
  Both of these goals fit well within the purpose of the state 
UDAP statutes and the child protection statutes.
164
  Absent legislation 
requiring that every dependent child receive legal representation in a 
dependency proceeding, the least the courts can do is prohibit government 
entities from tricking an abused, neglected, or abandoned child, and treat 
these vulnerable children to a legal process that is not riddled with unfairness 
and deception. 
                                                 
162. See supra Part III. 
163. See supra Parts IV–V. 
164. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.001(1)(a), 501.204(1); supra Part III. 
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